»The Time is out of Joint« by Laclau, Ernesto
»The Time is out of Joint«
Em esto Laclau
»Comme cette fin singulière du politique correspondrait à 
la présentation d ’une réalité absolument vivante il y  a là 
une raison de plus pour penser que l ’essence du politique 
aura toujours la figure inessentielle, l ’anessence même 
d'un fantôme«
Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx.
H alfway, in Spectres de Marx, Derrida links the concept of production to that of trauma and speaks of »la spiritualisation spectrale qui est à 
l’oeuvre dans toute ‘tekhne’ (SM, p. 16). He connects immediately this asser­
tion to Freud’s remarks concerning the three traumas inflicted to the narcis­
sism of the de-centered man: the psychological trauma derived from the 
psychoanalytic discovery of the unconscious, the biological trauma resulting 
from the Darwinian findings about human descent, and the cosmological 
trauma proceeding from the Copernican revolution. To this Derrida adds the 
decentering effects coming from Marxism which, according to him, accumu­
late and put together the other three: »le siècle du ‘Marxisme’ aura été celui du 
décentrement techno-scientifique et effectif de la Terra, du géopolitique, de 
l’anthropos dans son identité onto-theologique, de l’ego cogito -  et du concept 
même de narcissisme dont les apories sont, disons pour aller trop vite et faire 
l’économie de tant de références, le thème explicite de la déconstruction« 
(SM,pp. 161-162).
So, deconstruction inscribes itself in a secular movement of de-centering, to 
which Marxism itself belongs. Even more, at various points of Spectres de 
Marx, Derrida insists that deconstruction would be either inconceivable or 
irrelevant unless it is related to the spirit or the tradition of a certain Marxism. 
And, however, deconstruction is not just Marxism: it is a certain operation 
practised in the body of Marxism, the location, in Marx’s texts of an area of 
undecidability which, in Derrida’s terms, is that circumscribed by the opposi-
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tion between spirit and spectre, between hauntology and ontology. The per­
forming of this deconstructive operation -  to which the last two chapters of the 
book are devoted -  is far from being a purely academic exercise: the very 
possibility of justice-but also of politics -  is at stake. Without the constitutive 
dislocation that inhabits all hauntology -  and that ontology tries to conceal -  
there would not be politics but just a programmed, predetermined reduction of 
the other to the same. (»On passe facilement du désajusté à l’injust. C’est notre 
problème: comment justifier ce passage du désajustement (valeur plutôt 
technico-ontologique affectant une présence) à une injustice qui ne serait plus 
ontologique? Et si le désajustement était au contraire la condition de la justice? 
Et si ce double registre condensait son énigme, justement, et potentialisait sa 
sur-puissance dans ce qui donne sa force inouïe à la parole de Hamlet: The 
time is out o f joint?« (SM, p. 44).)
To find a double logic in Marx’s work, to detect in the Marxian texts a double 
gesture that the theory makes possible but that it is unable to conceptually 
control in a credible synthesis: all this looks rather familiar. Since the end of 
the XlXth Century, this duality, deeply inscribed in Marx’s work, has been the 
object of countless analyses. The duality between determinism and ethical 
orientation of socialism, between economism and the primacy of politics, even 
between the »scientific« and »ideological« components of the theory, have 
been not only recurrent themes in Marxist discussions but the very issue which 
has made possible a history of Marxism. However, none of these apparent 
reformulations of the terms of a widely perceived dualism has been similar to 
the others. We are not dealing with a purely nominalistic operation of re­
naming: the displacement that these reformulations operate, the logics of the 
social that they imply and, above all, the political strategies that they make 
possible, are radically different. Derrida does not trace the genealogy of his 
intervention in the Marxian text. This is regrettable, among other things 
because its specificity, originality and potentialities do not come sufficiently 
to the light. In what follows, I will try to stress some of these specific features, 
as well as their originality vis-à-vis other comparable attempts. To this effect, I 
will refer to what I think are two central theoretical points in Derrida’s book: 
the logic of the spectre (the hauntology) and the category of messianism.
The Logic o f the Spectre
»(L)e spectre est une incorporation paradoxale, le devenir corps, une certain 
forme phénoménale et charnelle de l’esprit. Il devient plutôt quelque ‘chose’ 
qu’il rests difficile à nommer: ni âme ni corps, et l’une et l’autre. Car la chaire 
et la phénomenalité, voilà ce qui donne à l’esprit son apparition spectrale, mais 
disparaît aussitôt dans l’apparition, dans la venue même du revenant ou le
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retour du spectre. Il y a du disparu dans l’apparition même comme réapparition 
du disparu« (SM, p. 25). Anachronism is essential to spectrality: the spectre, 
interrupting all specularity, desynchronizes time. The very essence of spectrality 
is to be found in this undecidability between flesh and spirit: it is not purely 
body -  for in that case there would be no spectrality at all; but it is no pure 
spirit either -  for the passage through the flesh is crucial if we are going to 
have a spectre. »Car il n ’y a pas de fantôme, il n’y a jamais de devenir-spectre 
de l’esprit sans au moins une apparence de chaire, dans un espace de visibilité 
invisible, comme dis-paraître d’une apparition. Pour qu’il y a du phantôme, il 
faut un retour au corps, mais à un corps plus abstrait que jamais. Le processus 
spectrogène répond donc à une incorporation paradoxale. Une fois l’idée ou la 
pensée (Gedanke) détachées de leur substrat, on engendre du phantôme en leur 
donnant du corps« (SM, p. 202).
From this point onwards, Derrida makes a classic deconstructive move: the 
spectre being undecidable between the two extremes of body and spirit, these 
extremes themselves become contaminated by that undecidability. Thus, hav­
ing showed how, in Marx’s analysis of commodity, exchange value depends 
for its constitution on a spectral logic, Derrida concludes that this logic is not 
absent from use value either: »Ladite valeur d’usage de ladite chose sensible 
ordinaire, la hylè simple, le bois de la table de bois dont Marx suppose qu’elle 
n ’a pas encore commencé à ‘danser’, il a bien fallu que sa forme même, la 
forme qui informe sa hylè, la promette au moins à l ’iterabilité, à la substitution 
à l’exchange, à la valeur, et qu’elle amorce, si peu que ce soit, une idéalisation 
qui permette de l’identifier comme la même à travers des répétitions possibles, 
etc. Pas plus qu’il n’y a d’usage pur, il n’y a aucune valeur d ’usage que la 
possibilité de l’échange et du commerce ... n’inscrive d ’avance dans un hors- 
d ’usage -  signification débordante qui ne se réduit pas à l’inutile« (SM, p. 
254). In the same way, if the spirit is something whose invisibility has to 
produce its own visibility of the invisible, nothing is more difficult than to 
keep a strict separation between spirit and spectre. Once this point has been 
reached, the conclusion follow quickly. We find in Marx an hauntology, an 
argument about spectrality being at the very heart of the constitution of the 
social link. Time being »out of joint«, dislocation corrupting the identity with 
itself of any present, we have a constitutive anachronism which is at the root of 
any identity. Any »life« emerges out of a more basic life/death dichotomy -  it 
is not »life« as uncontamined presence but »survie« which is the condition of 
any presence. Marx, however, attempted the critique of the hauntological from 
the perspective of an ontology. If the spectre inhabits the root of the social link 
in bourgeois society, the transcendence of the latter, the arrival to a time which 
is no longer »out of joint«, the realization of a society fully reconciled with 
itself, will open the way to the »end of ideology« -  i.e. to a purely »ontologi-
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cal« society which, after the consummation of the proletarian millennium, will 
look to hauntology as its past. Hauntology is inherent to politics -  so, the 
transcendence of the split between being and appearance will mean the end of 
politics. (We could, actually, put the argument in Saint-Simonian terms: the 
transition from the government of men to the administration of things.) If, 
however, the deconstructive reading shows that »ontology« -  full reconcilia­
tion -  is unachievable, that time is constitutively »out of joint«, that the ghost 
is the condition of possibility of any present, politics becomes also constitutive 
of the social link. We could say of the spectre what Groucho Marx said about 
sex: it is going to stay with us for a while.
This contamination of presence by the spectre can be considered from the two 
perspectives involved in a double genetive. There are, in the first place, 
spectres of Marx, as far as Marx himself -  an abbreviation for communism -  is 
haunting us today as a horizon preventing the possibility of being finally 
exorcised by the apparently triumphant capitalist »democracies« (here the 
main reference is Fukuyama). But there are also spectres of Marx, as far as 
they were those that visited Marx himself and prevent him from establishing a 
non-haunting ontology. Thus, the ground that we reach -  that of a present 
never identical with itself -  is the very terrain of this phantasmatic, non- 
essential practice that we call politics.
What to comment about this Derridean sequence? A first remark -  first both 
temporally and logically -  is that I have nothing to object to. The deconstructive 
operation is impeccable, the horizons that it opens are far reaching and the 
intertextuality within which it takes place is highly illuminating. However, as 
any deconstruction worth of the name, there is a plurality of directions one can 
move out of it, and it is to consider this plurality that I would like to pause for 
a moment. My own work has largely concentrated on the deconstruction of 
Marxist texts and I could, prima facie, relate what I have called hegemonic 
logic1 -  which silently deconstructs Marxist categories -  to the logic of the 
spectre as described by Derrida. Not only me -  there have been several recent 
attempts to link »deconstruction« and »hegemony«. Simon Critchley, for 
instance, in a recent piece, has asserted: »Against the troubling tendency to 
subordinate the political to the socio-economic within Marx’s »ontology« ... 
Derrida’s argument for a logic of spectrality within Marxism can be linked to 
the claim for the irreducability of the political understood as the moment 
where the sedimented meanings of the socio-economic are contested.
' The basic formulation concerning the concept of »hegemony« can be found in E. Laclau and 
C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist strategy, Verso, London 1985, chapters 3 and 4. I have 
reformulated the basic dimensions of this concept, linking it more closely to the category of 
»dislocation« in New Reflections on the Revolution o f  our Time, Verso, London 1990.
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Following Ernesto Laclau’s radicalization of Gramsci, one might link the 
logic of spectrality to the logic of hegemony; that is, if one renounces -  as one 
must -  the communist eschatological »a-theodicy« of the economic contradic­
tions of capitalism inevitably culminating in revolution, then politics and 
politico-cultural-ideological hegemonization is indispensable to the possibil­
ity of radical change«.2
I hesitate, however, before entirely endorsing such an apparently obvious 
assimilation. The reason for this is that, although there is no incompatibility 
between hegemony and spectral logic as far as the latter goes, a hegemonic 
logic presupposes some further steps beyond spectrality which I am not sure 
that Derrida is prepared to take: These steps are essentially two:
1. Spectrality presupposes, as we have seen, an undecidable relation between 
spirit and flesh which contaminate, in turn, these two poles. It presupposes, 
in that sense, a weakened form of incarnation. Weakened because a full 
incarnation -  an incarnation in the Christian sense -  transforms the flesh 
into a purely transparent medium through which we can see an entirely 
spiritual reality without any connection with its incarnating body. God’s 
mediation is what establishes the link between spirit and flesh as far as He 
is at an infinite distance from both. So, the lack of natural connection 
between both poles is what transforms the flesh into the medium through 
which the spirit shows itself, but, at the same time, it is this lack of 
connection which prevents the contamination of one by the other. No doubt 
that Christian polarity can be deconstructed in turn, but the important point 
is that this deconstruction will not pass through the collapse of the frontier 
between spirit and spectre. For in the spectre the relation between spirit and 
flesh is much more intimate: there is no divine mediation which both 
sanctions and supersedes the essential heterogeneity of the two poles. Now, 
a hegemonic relation is one in which a certain body presents itself as the 
incarnation of a certain spirit. The hegemonic relation is certainly spectral: 
a certain body tries to present its particular features as the expression of 
something transcending its own particularity. The body is in an undecidable 
point in which universality and particularity get confused, but the very fact 
that other bodies compete to be the incarnating ones, that they are alterna­
tive forms of materialization of the same »spirit«, suggest a kind of 
autonomization of the latter which cannot only be explained by the pure 
logic o f spectrality.
2. Of what does this autonomization consist? This is our second step. Let us 
remember that any step which is taken out of the logic of spectrality cannot
2 S. Critchley, »On Derrida’s Spectres o f Marx«, paper delivered in October 1994 to the meeting 
of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in Seattle.
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be in contradiction to the latter but has, on the contrary, to presuppose it. If 
the autonomization of the »spirit« is to take place within spectrality, »au­
tonomy« cannot mean identity with oneself, self-representation, because 
that would, precisely, restore a rigid frontier between »spirit« and »spec­
tre«. But autonomy does not require full identity as its precondition: it can 
also emerge out of a constitutive impossibility, an absolute limit whose 
forms of representation will be necessarily inadequate. Let us suppose a 
situation of generalized social disorder: in such a situation »order« be­
comes the name of an absent fullness, and if that fullness is constitutively 
unachievable it cannot have any content of its own, any form o f self­
representation. »Order« becomes thus autonomous vis-à-vis any particular 
order as far as is the name of an absent fullness that no concrete social order 
can achieve (and the same can be said of similar terms such as »revolu­
tion«, »unity of the people«, etc.). That fullness is present, however, as that 
which is absent and needs as a result to be represented in some way. Now, 
its means of representation will be constitutively inadequate, for they can 
only be particular contents which assume, in certain circumstances a func­
tion of representation of the impossible universality of the community. 
This relation, by which a certain particular content overflows its own 
particularity and becomes the incarnation of the absent fullness of society 
is, exactly, what I call a hegemonic relation. As we can see, it presupposes 
the logic of the spectre: the fullness of the »spirit«, as it has no content of its 
own, can only exist through its parasitic attachment to some particular 
body; but that body is subverted and deformed in its own particularity as it 
becomes the embodiment of fullness. This means, inter alia, that the 
anachronistic language of revolutions, which Marx refers to and Derrida 
analyses is inevitable: the old revolution is present in the new one, not in its 
particularity but in its universal function of being a revolution, as the 
incarnation of the revolutionary principle as such. And the Marxian aspira­
tion of a revolutionary language which only expresses the present, in which 
the »content« overcomes »phraseology« is a pure impossibility. If the 
fullness of the revolution -  as all fullness -  is unachievable, we cannot have 
but a dissociation between the revolutionary content and the fullness of a 
pure revolutionary foundation, and this dissociation will reproduce sine die 
the logic of spectrality and the split between »phraseology« and »content«.
What precedes is an attempt at showing the type of move that I would make 
out of the logic of spectrality. But, as I said, it is not the only move that one can 
make. The steps which lead from the logic of spectrality to a hegemonic logic 
are steps which the former logic makes certainly possible, but not necessary 
corollaries derived from it.
But what political consequences does Derrida himself draw from his
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deconstruction of Marx’s texts? Although these consequences are not entirely 
developed in his book, we can have a broad hint of the direction that Derrida is 
taking, if we move to our second theme: the question of the messianic.
The Question o f the Messianic
Let us quote Derrida again. After having indicated that both Marxism and 
religion share the formal structure of a messianic eschatology, he asserts: »Si 
elle [the messianic eschatology] leur est commune [to Marxism and religion], 
à la différence près du contenu ... c’est aussi que sa structure formelle les 
déborde ou les précède. Eh bien, ce qui reste aussi irréductible à toute 
déconstruction, ce qui demeure aussi indéconstructible que la possibilité même 
de la déconstruction, c’est peut-être une certain expérience de la promesse 
émancipatoire; c’est peut-être même la formalité d’un messianisme structurel, 
un messianisme sans religion, un messianique, même, sans messianisme, une 
idée de la justice -  que nous distinguons toujours du droit et même des droits 
de l’homme -  et une idée de la démocratie -  que nous distinguons de son 
concept actuel et de ses prédicats déterminées aujourd’hui« (SM, p. 102).
Here Derrida summarizes themes that he developed in full in Force de loč. 
These themes and concepts require, however, that they are reinserted in the 
various discursive contexts within which they were originally formulated, 
firstly because these contexts considerably diverge between themselves and, 
secondly, because the high metaphoricity of some of the categories employed
-  such as the messianic -  can lead to an undue association of those categories 
with the concrete phenomena to which they are usually applied. I cannot 
properly do this job in the limited space of a review, but let us, at least, make 
some precisions. By the »messianic« we should not understand anything 
directly related to actual messianic movements -  of the present or the past -  
but, instead, something belonging to the general structure of experience. It is 
linked to the idea of »promise«. This does not mean this or that particular 
promise, but the promise implicit in an originary opening to the »other«, to the 
imprévisible, to the pure event which cannot be mastered by any aprioristic 
discourse. Such an event is an interruption in the normal course of things, a 
radical dislocation. This leads to the notion of »justice« as linked to an 
absolute singularity which cannot be absorbed by the generality of law. The 
chasm between law and justice is one which cannot be closed. The existence of 
this chasm is what makes deconstruction possible. Deconstruction and justice
-  or, rather, deconstruction as justice -  is that which cannot be deconstructed. 
Deconstructing law -  which is finally what politics is about -  is possible
3 J. Derrida, »Force o f Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’«, in D. Cornell et al. (ed.), 
Deconstruction and the Possibility o f  Justice, Routledge, New York and London, 1992.
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because of this structure of experience in which the messianic, the promise and 
justice are categories in a relation of mutual implication.
On the basis of these promises Derrida elaborates his concept of »democracy 
to come« (»démocratie à venir«). This »à venir« does not involve any teleo- 
logical assertion -  not even the limited one of a regulative idea -  but simply 
the continual commitment to keep open the relation to the other, an opening 
which is always à venir for the other to which one opens oneself is never 
already given in any aprioristic calculation. To summarize: the messianism we 
are speaking about is one without eschatology, without pre-given promised 
land, without determinate content. It is simply the structure of promise which 
is inherent in all experience and whose lack of content -  resulting from the 
radical opening to the event, to the other, is the very possibility of justice and 
gives its only meaning to the democracy to come. Singularity as the terrain of 
justice involves the radical undecidability which makes the decision possible. 
»II s’agissait alors de penser une autre historicité ... une autre ouverture de 
l’événementalité comme historicité qui permît de ne pas y renoncer mais au 
contraire d ’ouvrir l’accès à une pensée affirmative de la promesse messianique 
et émancipatoire comme promesse: comme promesse et non comme programme 
ou dessein onto-théologique ou téléo-eschatologique ... Mais à un certain point 
la promesse et la décision, c’est-à-dire la responsabilité, doivent leur possibilité 
à lépreuve de l’indecidabilité qui en restera toujours la condition« (SM, pp. 
125-26).
What to say about the various theoretical operations that Derrida performs 
starting from this conceptual construction? I think that we can distinguish here 
three levels. The first refers to the deconstruction of the concept of messianism 
that we have inherited from the religious but also from the Marxist tradition. 
This deconstruction proceeds by showing the contingent character of the 
articulations which have coalesced around the actual historical messianism. 
We can do away with the teleological and eschatological dimensions, we can 
even do away with all the actual contents of the historical messianisms but 
what we cannot do away with is the »promise«, because the latter is inscribed 
in the structure of all experience. This, as we have seen, is not a promise of 
anything concrete, it is some sort of »existential«, as far as it is what prevents 
any presence from being closed around itself. If we link this to the relation 
law/justice, undecidability/decisions, we can see the general movement of 
Derrida’s theoretico-political intervention, which is to lead back the historico- 
political forms to the primary terrain of their opening to the radically heteroge­
neous. This is the terrain of a constitutive undecidability, of an experience of 
the impossible which, paradoxically, makes possible responsibility, the deci­
sion, law and -  finally -  the messianic itself in its actual historical forms. I find 
myself in full agreement with this movement.
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Derrida’s argument, however, does not stop here. From this first movement 
(and, for reasons that will become clear presently, I keep this »from« deliber­
ately vague, undecided between the derivative and the merely sequential) he 
passes to a sort of ethico-political injunction by which all the previously 
mentioned dimensions converge in the project of a democracy to come which 
links with the classical notion of »emancipation«. Derrida is very firm in his 
assertion that he is unprepared to put at all the latter into question. But we have 
to be very careful about the meaning of such a stand, because the classical 
notion of emancipation is no more than another name for the eschatological 
messianism that he is trying to deconstruct.
We have to differentiate here between various aspects. If by reasserting the 
classical notion of emancipation Derrida does not mean anything beyond his 
particular way of reasserting messianism -  i.e. doing away with all the teleo- 
ontological paraphernalia of the latter and sticking to the moment of the 
»promise« -  then I would certainly agree with him, but in that case the classic 
idea of emancipation, even if we retain from it an ultimately undeconstructible 
moment, is deeply transformed. I find it rather misleading to call this operation 
a defence of the classic notion of emancipation. But -  second aspect -  the 
classic notion of emancipation was something more than the formal structure 
of the promise. It was also the crystallization and synthesis of a series of 
contents such as the elimination of economic exploitation and all forms of 
discrimination, the assertion of human rights, the consolidation of civil and 
political freedom, etc. Derrida, understandably, does not want to renounce to 
this patrimony and it would be difficult not to join him in its defence. The 
difficulty, however, is that in the classic notion of emancipation the defence 
and grounding of all those contents were intimately connected to the teleologi- 
cal eschatology that Derrida is deconstructing. So, if he wants to maintain the 
results of his deconstruction and, at the same time to defend those contents, as 
the ground of the latter can no longer be an eschatological articulation, there 
are only two ways opened to him: either to show that those contents can be 
derived from the »promise« as a general structure of experience; or to sustain 
that those contents are grounded in something less than such a general struc­
ture -  in which case the »promise« as such is indifferent to the actual nature of 
those contents.
There is, finally, a third aspect to be distinguished. The previous distinctions 
have to be put against the background of what is the real target of Derrida’s 
discussion in Spectres de Marx: the exposure of a prevalent common sense 
(that he exemplifies through his brilliant critique of Fukuyama) according to 
which the collapse of the communist regimes would have meant the entering 
of humanity in a final stage in which all human needs will be satisfied and in 
which no messianic consummation of times is any longer to be expected.
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Derrida reacts against this new dominant consensus and its Hegelo-Kojèvian 
grounding by showing, at empirical level, the gap between historical reality 
and the satisfied image of itself of the capitalist West and, at the theoretical 
level, the inconsistencies of the notion of an end of History. It is against the 
background of this polemic that the whole discourse about the always return­
ing spectres of Marx has to be understood. What Derrida is finally saying is 
that isolated demands, grievances, injustices, etc. are not empirical residues of 
an historical stage which has -  in all essentials -  been superseded, but that they 
are, on the contrary, the symptoms of a fundamental deadlock of contempo­
rary societies that pushes isolated demands to some kind of phantasmatic 
articulation which will result in new forms of political reaggregation. The 
latter are not specified beyond Derrida’s quick allusions to the historical limits 
of the »party« form and to a »New International« in the making. It is however 
clear that any advance in formulating a theory of political reaggregation cru­
cially depends on how the transition between the general structure of experi­
ence -  the promise -  and the contents of the classical emancipatory project is 
conceived.
This is the third level at which the argument of Spectres de Marx can be 
considered: the type of link which it establishes between the promise as a 
(post-) transcendental or (post-) ontological (non-) ground and the ethical and 
political contents of an emancipatory project. This is the level at which I find 
the argument of Spectres less convincing. For here an illegitimate logical 
transition can easily be made. I am not necessarily asserting that Derrida is 
making that transition but, at any rate, it is one frequently made by many 
defenders of deconstruction and one to which the very ambiguity of the 
Derridian texts gives some credence. The illegitimate transition is to think that 
from the impossibility of a presence closed in itself, from an »ontological« 
condition in which the openness to the event, to the heterogeneous, to the 
radically other is constitutive, some kind of ethical injunction to be respon­
sible and to keep oneself open to the heterogeneity of the other necessary 
follows. This transition is illegitimate for two reasons. Firstly, because if the 
promise is an »existential« constitutive of all experience, it is always already 
there, before any injunction. (It is like the voluntaristic argument criticised by 
Ortega y Gasset: on the one hand it asserts that life is constitutive insecurity; 
on the other, it launches the imperative Vivere pericolosamente, as if to do it or 
not to do it was a matter of choice). But, secondly and most importantly, from 
the fact that there is the impossibility of ultimate closure and presence, it does 
not follow that there is an ethical imperative to »cultivate« that openness or 
even less to be necessarily committed to a democratic society. I think that the 
later can certainly be defended from a deconstructionist perspective, but that 
defence cannot be logically derived from constitutive openness -  something
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more has to be added to the argument. Precisely because of the undecidability 
inherent in constitutive openness, ethico-political moves different or even 
opposite to a democracy »to come« can be made -  e.g. that as there is ultimate 
undecidability and, as a result, no immanent tendency of the structure to 
closure and full presence, closure has to be artificially brought about from the 
outside. In that way a case for totalitarianism can be presented starting from 
deconstructionist premises. Of course, the totalitarian argument would be as 
much a non sequitur as the argument for democracy: the decision to move in 
one or the other direction are equally possible given the situation of structural 
undecidability.
We have so far presented our argument concerning the non-connection be­
tween structural undecidability and ethical injunction, starting from the »onto­
logical« side. But if we move to the »normative« side, the conclusions are 
remarkably similar. Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that open­
ness to the heterogeneity of the other is an ethical injunction. If one takes this 
propositions at face value, one is forced to conclude that we have to accept the 
other as different because she is different, whatever the content of that hetero­
geneity would be. This does not sound very much like an ethical injunction, 
but as ethical nihilism. And if the argument is reformulated by saying that 
openness to the other does not necessarily mean passive acceptance of her but 
rather active engagement which includes criticizing her, attacking her, even 
killing her, the whole argument starts looking rather vacuous: what else do 
people do all the time without any need for an ethical injunction?
And, however, I think that deconstruction has important consequences for 
both ethics and politics. These consequences, however, depend on decon­
struction’s ability to go down to the bottom of its own radicalism and avoid 
becoming entangled in all the problems of a Levinasian ethics (whose pro­
claimed aim: to present ethics as first philosophy, should look from the start 
suspicious to any deconstructionist). I see the matter this way. Undecidability 
should be literally taken as that condition from which no course of action 
necessarily follows. This means that we should not make it the necessary 
source of any concrete decision in the ethical or political sphere. That is, that 
in a first movement deconstruction extends undecidability -  i.e. that which 
makes the decision necessary -  to deeper and larger areas of social relations. 
The role of deconstruction is, from this perspective, to reactivate the moment 
of decision which underlie any sedimented set of social relations. The political 
and ethical significance of this first movement is that by enlarging the area of 
structural undecidability it enlarges also the area of responsibility -  that is, of 
the decision. (In Derridean terms: the requirements of justice become more 
complex and multifacetic vis-à-vis law.)
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But this first movement is immediately balanced by another one of the oppo­
site sign, which is also essential to deconstruction. It would be wrong to think 
of undecidability as a bottomless abyss which underlies any self-sufficient 
»presence«. This approach still maintains too much of the imagery of the 
»ground«. The duality undecidability/decision is simply something which 
belongs to the logic of any structural arrangement. De-grounding is, in this 
sense, also part of an operation of grounding, except that grounding is no 
longer to refer something back to a foundation which would act as a principle 
of derivation but, instead, to reinscribe that something within the terrain of the 
undecidables (iteration, re-mark, differance, etc.) which make its emergence 
possible. So, to go back to our problem, it is no longer a question of finding a 
ground from which an ethical injunction should be derived (even less to make 
of undecidability itself such a ground). We live as bricoleurs in a plural world, 
having to take decisions within incomplete systems of rules (incompletion 
means here undecidability) and some of these rules are ethical ones. It is 
because of this constitutive incompletion that decisions have to be taken, but 
because we are faced with incompletion and not with total dispossession, the 
problem of a total ethical grounding -  either through the opening to the 
otherness of the other, or through any similar metaphysical principle -  never 
arises. »The time is out of joint«, but because of that there is never a beginning
-  nor an end -  of time. Democracy does not need -  and cannot be -  radically 
grounded. To move to a more democratic society we can only do through a 
plurality of acts of democratization. The consummation of times -  as Derrida 
knows well -  never arrives. Not even as a regulative idea.
This leaves us, however, with a problem: how to conceive of emancipation 
within this framework? What kind of collective reaggregation is open to us 
once we have moved away from the eschatological dimension of the classical 
emancipatory model? This will be my last discussion and I will broach it by 
locating Derrida’s intervention within the tradition of critique and reformula­
tion of Marxism.
The Question o f the Tradition
Derrida very cogently sustains that one only thinks from within a tradition and 
shows that this thinking is only possible if one conceives one’s relation with 
that past as a critical reception. Now, the reception of Marxism since the turn 
of the century has turned, in my view, around the discussion of two capital and 
interrelated issues: 1) how to make compatible -  if it can be done at all -  the 
various contradictory aspects of Marx’s thought -  as, in Derrida’s version the 
relation between the »ontological« and the »phantasmatic«; 2) how to think 
forms of reaggregation of political wills and social demands once the obvious­
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ness of the identification of the working class with the emancipatory agency 
started to dissolve. It is my contention that the deconstructionist intervention 
represents a crucial turn in connection with both issues. To show it, let us 
recapitulate the broad lines of the main classical attempt at recasting Marxism.
1) A first tendency represents the accentuation of the ontological dimension 
(in the Derridean sense) of Marx’s thought. The absolute reconciliation of 
society with itself will arrive as a result of the elimination of all forms of 
distorted representation. The latter will be the consequence of the proletar­
ian revolution. This tendency can be found in a vulgar materialist version 
(e.g. Plekhanov) or in an apparently more »superstructuralist« one, cen­
tered in the notion of »false consciousness« (as in Lukàcs). There is here no 
reaggregation of collective wills (the revolutionary agent is the working 
class) and human emancipation is fixed in its contents by a fully fledged 
eschatology.
2) The various forms of »ethical« socialism, to be found in Bernstein and in 
some currents of Austro-Marxism. The common feature of all these ten­
dencies is a return to a Kantian dualism. Here the ontological dimension 
becomes weaker: the »necessary laws of history« become more erratic, the 
agent of emancipation becomes more contingent and indeterminate and the 
Endziel loses most of its eschatological precision. However, the determinacy 
which has been lost at the level of an objective history is retrieved at the 
level of an ethical regulative idea. The moment of the political decision is 
as absent as in Marxist orthodoxy.
3) The Sorelian-Gramscian tradition. It is here that the phantasmatic dimen­
sion finally takes the upper hand. The anchorage of social representations 
in the ontological bedrock of an objective history, starts dissolving. The 
unity of the class is, for Sorel, a mythical unity. For Gramsci, the unity of a 
collective will results from the constitutive role of an organic ideology. 
History becomes an open and contingent process which does not reflect any 
deeper underlying reality. Two aspects are important for us: a) the link 
between concrete material forces and the function that they fulfil in the 
classical Marxist scheme become loose and indeterminate. »Collective 
will«, »organic ideology«, »hegemonic group«, etc. become empty forms 
which can be filled by any imaginable political and social content. They are 
certainly anchored in a dialectics of emancipation, but as the latter is not 
necessary linked to any particular content, it becomes something like an 
»existential« of historical life and is no longer the announcement of a 
concrete event. Now, is this not something like a deconstruction of 
eschatological messianism, the autonomization of the messianic promise 
from the contents that it is attached to in »actually existing« messianisms? 
b) the distinction between the ethical and the political is blurred. The
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moment of the ethico-political is presented as a unity. This can, of course, 
be given a Hegelian interpretation, but my argument is that this would be a 
wrong reading for what is really at stake in Gramsci’s intervention is a 
politization of ethics as far as the acts of institution of the social link are 
contingent acts of decision which presuppose relations of power. This is 
what gives its »ontological« primacy to politics and to »hegemony« as the 
logic governing any political intervention.
I have said enough to make clear that for me it is only as an extension and 
radicalization of this last tendency that deconstruction can present itself both 
as a moment of its inscription in the Marxist tradition as well as a point of 
turning/deepening/supersession of the latter. My optimistic reading of Spec­
tres de Marx is that it represents a step forward in the prosecution of this task. 
The main stumbling block that I still see for this to be accomplished -  at least 
as far as Derrida is concerned -  is that the ambiguity previously pointed out 
between undecidability as a terrain of radicalization of the decision and 
undecidability as the source of an ethical injunction is still hovering in Derrida’s 
texts. As far as this ambiguity is, however, superseded deconstruction can 
become one of the most powerful tools at hand for thinking strategically.
This rethinking of politics in a deconstructive fashion can (if we start from the 
Marxist tradition) produce three types of effect. In the first place, if we are 
thinking in our third tendency within Marxism, we can recast and extend its 
system of categories far beyond the intellectual tools to which Sorel or Gramsci 
had access. This recasting in terms of the logic of différance can open the way 
to much more refined forms of strategic thinking.
Secondly, the logics of hegemonic reaggregation face, in the contemporary 
world, much more serious challenges than those that a Gramsci was con­
fronted with. Our societies are far less homogeneous that those in which the 
Marxian models were formulated and the constitution of the collective wills 
take place in terrains crossed by far more complex relations of power -  as a 
result, inter alia, of the development of the mass media. The dissolution of the 
metaphysics of presence is not a purely intellectual operation. It is profoundly 
inscribed in the whole experience of the last decades. Deconstruction, as a 
result, faces the challenge of reinscribing the Marxian model in this complex 
experience of present day society.
Finally, operating deconstructively within Marx’s texts can help in a third 
vitally important task: reinscribing Marxism itself and each one of its discur­
sive components as a partial moment in the wider history of emancipatory 
discourses. Derrida is quite right in combating the current amnesia of the 
Marxist tradition. But let us not make the opposite mistake and think that the 
history of Marxism overlaps with the history of emancipatory projects. Many
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more ghosts that those of Marx are actually visiting and re-visiting us. 
Benjamin’s angel should become a symbol constantly reminding us of our 
complex and multi-layered tradition. I remember that during my childhood, in 
Argentina, in the cinemas of continuous performance there was an announce­
ment saying »The performance begins when you arrive«. Well, I think that 
»emancipation« is the opposite: it is a performance to which we always arrive 
late and which forces us to guess, painfully, about its mythical or impossible 
origins. We have, however, to engage ourselves in this impossible task which 
is, among other things, what gives its meaning to deconstruction.
A s ign i f i c ant  con tr ib u t i on  to one  o f  the m ost  im p o r t a n t  s t ra ins  of  
current  po l i t i ca l  theory...
R e c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  P o l i t i c a l
Edited by David Howarth and A letta  J. Norval
Department of Government, University o f Essex, United Kingdom
Reconsidering the Political centres on a rethinking of the  political in late 
m odernity from a poststructuralist perspective. It includes international 
contributions dealing with the form  and character of political spaces and 
institutions in the  present; contem porary  theoretical debates concerning 
the relationship between s ta te  and civil society, and politics and ethics; as 
well as m ore concrete historical analyses.
Reconsidering the Political provides an am bitious contribution to  a recasting 
of traditional problem atics of political philosophy and th e  developm ent of 
political analysis in te rm s of th e  insights of poststructuralist theory.
C o n t e n t s
I  Politics, Ethics, Identity: Reconsidering the  Political,
David Howarth and Aletta J. Norval 
I  Tracing the Political, Benjamin Arditi 
I  Enacting the  Political, Michael Cholewa-Madsen 
I  Negotiating the  Paradoxes of C ontem porary  Politics,
Interview with Ernesto Laclau 
I  Herculean Tasks, Dionysian Labor, Timothy S. Murphy 
I  Postm odern Law and th e  W ithering of Civil Society,
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt 
I  Civil Society: The Traum atic Patient,
Yael Shalem and David Bensusan 
I  Curiosity, Sue Golding
I  Fascination with Foucault: O bject and Desire of an Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Rudi Visker 
I  Agonal Thought: Reading N ietzsche as Political Thinker, David Owen 
I  Rorty’s Pragmatism: A rgum ent and Experience, Michael Reid 
I  The Reinvention of Democracy in Eastern Europe,
Jelica Sumic and Rado Riha 
I  The Politics of Homecoming: Contending Identities in 
C ontem porary South Africa, Aletta J. Norval 
I  Post-Democracy, Politics and Philosophy,
Interview with Jacques Rancière
I  The Aims of Radicalism, Michael Reid
S p e c if ic a t io n s
Reconsidering the Political
(Angelaki Vol. I ,  No. 3 ISSN: 0969 -7 25X )
January 1995 200 pages Softbound 
ISBN: 1-899567-02-X
Price (inc. p+p*): Individuals: US$l0.00/£5.00
♦ In te rn a t io n a l  o r d e r s  s e n t  by  a ir  Institutions: US$I5.00/£8.00
Send your order with paym ent to:
Angelaki 44 Abbey Road Oxford 0X 2 OAE United Kingdom
